ABSTRACT Deniable authenticated encryption (DAE) is a cryptographic primitive that supports data confidentiality with deniable authentication in an efficient manner. The DAE plays a significant role in location-based service systems for privacy protection. In this paper, we construct a certificateless DAE (CLDAE) scheme. The CLDAE is based on certificateless cryptosystems (CLCs), which avoids the need to manage public key certificates in public key infrastructure (PKI)-based cryptosystems and key escrow problems in identity-based cryptosystems (IBCs). Our design utilizes hybrid methods: tag-key encapsulation mechanism (TKEM) and data encapsulation mechanism (DEM). This technique is more suitable for location-based applications. We show how to construct a CLDAE scheme utilizing a certificateless deniable authenticated tag-KEM (CLDATK) and a DEM. We also design a CLDATK scheme and provide formal security proof using the random oracle model (ROM). We conduct a comprehensive performance analysis, which shows that CLDAE is highly efficient in terms of communication overhead. We also provide an application of the CLDAE for a location-based service (LBS) system. INDEX TERMS Deniable authenticated encryption (DAE), certificateless cryptography, random oracle model, location-based services (LBSs).
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid expansion in mobile social networks, smart devices, and localization techniques, location-based service (LBS) have become an indispensable part of daily life duo to the fact that they provide users with various types of services related to location [1] - [3] .
To use an LBS, users submit their location-based requirements (a nearest point of interest (POI), such as the nearest hospital, gas station or movie theatre) to a location-based service provider (LBSP); Then the LBSP returns the location response to the users. On the basis of this, the LBSP can deduce from private information about the user, such as commute routes, daily activity trajectories, and social connections. For example, when a user requests an LBS for hospital, the LBSP could predict that the user may have a health problem.
While users enjoy the tremendous convenience of LBSs, using these services exposes private information and risks
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disclosure [4] - [12] . An adversary colluding with the LBSP can obtain sensitive user information, which threatens user privacy. For example, according to the revealed user data, the malicious adversary may abuse them to track, rob or make sure no one in the house to steal.
Therefore, protecting location-based privacy disclosure is a huge challenge. Generally, digital signature can realize authentication. However, it also has another property: nonrepudiation. It means that any third party can verify the validity of the signature. Hence, traditional digital signature can not guarantee the user's location privacy. Deniable authentication [13] can solve this problem. It is such an authentication: it allows the LBSP to confirm the source of a submitted location-based query but without the ability to provide that source to any third party. So deniable authentication can ensure the location privacy of users.
A. RELATED WORKS
Three related notions are introduced, CLC, hybrid encryption, and deniable authentication.
Based on deniable authentication, Zeng et al. [14] designed a scheme for LBSs. However, their scheme is based on PKI, which requires blinding the public key certificate and the user's public key. This increases the computational cost of the user. To avoid utilizing public key certificates, an IBC was designed by Shamir [15] . In an IBC, a user's public key can be obtained from identifying information such as telephone numbers and identification numbers. Its private key is generated by a private key generator (PKG), who is known to be a trusted third party. Nevertheless, because the PKG is capable of acquiring the private key of every entity, the IBC has a key escrow problem. To solve the key escrow problem in IBC, CLC was proposed [16] . In a CLC, a partial private key associated with a user's identity is produced by a key generator center (KGC). Then, the user's complete private key is created by integrating its partial private key with a secret value selected by the user. This approach solves the key escrow problem because the KGC is no longer capable of obtaining the secret key, which means that it cannot calculate the complete private key.
The most appropriate way to encrypt large messages is to utilize hybrid encryption, which consists of two parts: a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) and a data encapsulation mechanism (DEM). The KEM utilizes public key techniques to encrypt a session key, while the DEM employs the session key to encrypt the actual data. Cramer and Shoup [17] constructed and analyzed the first hybrid encryption scheme. Abe et al. [18] designed a hybrid tag/KEM-DEM encryption framework. The proposed scheme takes a tag as input, making it simpler and improving its security. Subsequently, some other KEM-DEM hybrid encryption schemes [19] - [24] have been designed. Thus, their construction allows for a modular design and provides a clear separation of these two parts. Sakai and Hanaoka [25] designed a hybrid encryption method with tag using a non-interactive proof that can encrypt arbitrary-length plaintexts. Baek et al. [26] designed a stateful KEM-DEM encryption scheme that recycles some random parameters by holding a state to reduce the current random value. This approach is beneficial because it reduces the number of required computations.
Deniable authentication (DA) possesses two main characteristics: (1) an authorized receiver with the ability to determine the source of a given message; (2) the authorized receiver is not capable of providing the source of the given message to a third party. Thus, DA is suitable for privacy scenarios such as LBSs and ad hoc networks [27] , [28] . Jin et al. proposed some CLDA schemes [29] - [32] ; however, these schemes cannot achieve confidentiality. To ensure the privacy-preservation of the transmitted message, some deniable authenticated encryption (DAE) schemes have been constructed. Li et al. [33] presented a DAE scheme that simultaneously achieves confidentiality, integrity and deniable authentication. However, their scheme works in a PKI environment; consequently, it has the public key management problem. To solve this problem, Li et al. [34] constructed a tag/KEM-DEM hybrid DAE scheme and showed it to be highly efficient through a comprehensive analysis. Nevertheless, their scheme has the key escrow problem, which means that the PKG is capable of knowing all the entities' private keys. Subsequently, Ahene et al. [35] constructed a CLDAE scheme that avoided utilizing public key certificates, but it assumed the participation of a fully trusted PKG.
B. MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTION
Motivated by the approaches described above, we construct a CLDAE scheme. Our design employs tag-KEM and DEM hybrid encryption methods, which are advantageous in realworld scenarios. The concrete CLDAE construction process is shown in our scheme. We construct a CLDATK scheme and give a formal security proof in the random oracle model (ROM). We also apply our CLDAE scheme to an LBS system.
C. ORGANIZATION
The following is the arrangement of this paper. In Section 2, we present a formal model for CLDAE, and a formal model for CLDATK is described in Section 3. In Section 4, we describes the construction process for a CLDAE on the basis of a CLDATK and a DEM and design a concrete CLDATK scheme in Section 5. We discuss the results of a comprehensive performance analysis in Section 6. In Section 7, we provide an application of CLDAE to an LBS system. In Section 8, we provide the conclusions.
II. FORMAL MODEL FOR CLDAE
The security notions for CLDAE are given in this section.
A. SYNTAX
A CLDAE scheme comprises the following six algorithms:
Setup: Given k (a security parameter), the KGC produces the params and a master private/public key pair (s, P pub ). Other algorithms do not need to include the params because they are public.
Partial-Private-Key-Extract: Given s and ID (a user's identity), the KGC calculates a partial private key D ID .
Set-Secret-Key: Given ID, a user outputs x ID (a secret key) and PK ID (the corresponding public key).
Set 
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• Deniable authentication: the receiver creates a deniable transcript that is probabilistically indistinguishable from the sender. Type I and Type II adversaries exist in [16] , [36] , [37] . Type I is an attacker imitating a user but does not know the master private key of the KGC. It is capable of replacing users' public keys. Type II is an attacker who is a KGC can obtain the master private key. However, it is not capable of replacing users' public keys.
For confidentiality, the standard security concept used in our construction is indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2). In this study, there are two games ''IND-CCA2-I'' and ''IND-CCA2-II''. It is assumed that the two games are played between Type I/II adversaries with their challengers as follows.
''IND-CCA2-I'' game: Setup: C executes Setup algorithm, transmits the params to F I and keeps s secret.
Phase 1: F I executes the following queries.
• Partial private key (PPK) queries: F I elects an identity ID. C executes the PPK algorithm and transmits its PPK D ID to F I .
• Private key (PVK) queries: F I elects an identity ID. C first calculates the PPK D ID and the secret key (sk) x ID . Then, it transmits SK ID = (x ID , D ID ) to F I . Note that if a public key corresponding to an identity has been replaced, F I cannot query the identity because C is unconscious of the secret key.
• Request public key (RPK) queries: F I elects an identity ID. C checks whether an item (ID i , PK ID i , x ID i ) is in the list L k . If yes, then C outputs PK ID i . Otherwise, C produces an item, adds it into L k and outputs the corresponding public key.
• Public key replacement (PKR) queries: F I may select a new value to replace the original public key.
• DAE queries: • Private key queries: These queries are the same as those in the IND-CCA2-I game.
• Request public key queries: These queries are the same as those in the IND-CCA2-I game.
• DAE queries: These queries are the same as those in the IND-CCA2-I game.
• DAD queries: These queries are the same as those in the IND-CCA2-I game. In the IND-CCA2-i game, we suppose that the adversary can execute a PVK query on identity ID * s , thus ensuring the scheme's forward security. That is, even if the sender's private key is compromised, confidentiality is preserved.
For deniable authentication, the security concept used in our construction is deniable authentication against adaptive chosen message attacks (DA-CMA). Here, there are two games ''DA-CMA-I'' and ''DA-CMA-II''. It is assumed that these two games are played between Type I/II adversaries with their challengers as follows.
''DA-CMA-I'' game: Setup: The description is the same as that in the IND-CCA2-I game.
Attack: The description is the same as that in the IND-CCA2-I game. The advantage of F II is defined as the probability that it will win. Definition 2: A CLDAE scheme is DA-CMA-i (i ∈ {I , II }) secure if there is no PPT adversary F I (or F II ) that wins the ''DA-CMA-i'' game with a non-negligible advantage.
From the above definition, we can see that the adversary is not allowed to perform a private key query on the identity ID * r , which is essential for achieving deniability. The sender and the receiver can create an indistinguishable transcript.
C. DATA ENCAPSULATION MECHANISM (DEM)
There are two algorithms in a DEM.
• Enc: This algorithm takes a system parameter k, a message m, a key K , and returns a ciphertext c. We can denote as c ← Enc(K , m).
• Dec: This algorithm takes a ciphertext c, a key K , and returns a message m or ⊥, which implies c is not valid. For a DEM, the security concept used in our construction is indistinguishability against passive attackers (IND-PA). Here, the game, is played between an adversary and its challenger, and we describe it as follows.
''IND-PA'' game: Setup: A submits (m 0 , m 1 ), which are of equal length. Challenge: C randomly elects K , β ∈ {0, 1}, and transmits c * = Enc(K , m β ), which is a challenged ciphertext to A. Guess: A returns a guess β . If β = β, it wins the game. The advantage of A is
in which Pr[β = β] represents the probability. Definition 3: A DEM is DA-CPA secure if no PPT adversary A exists that wins the above game with a non-negligible advantage.
III. CLDATK
The following security notions for CLDATK are given in this section.
A. SYNTAX
A generic CLDATK comprises seven algorithms as follows:
Setup: The description is the same as that for CLDAE in Section 2.
Partial-Private-Key-Extract: The description is the same as that for CLDAE in Section 2.
Set-Secret-Key: The description is the same as that for CLDAE in Section 2.
Set-Private-Key: The description is the same as that for CLDAE in Section 2.
Sym: Given a sender's ID s , PK ID s , SK ID s , a receiver's ID r , and PK ID r , the sender generates a symmetric key K and the internal state information ω.
Encap: Given an arbitrary tag τ and the internal state information ω, the sender produces an encapsulation ϕ.
Decap: Given ϕ, τ , ID s , PK ID s , ID r , PK ID r and SK ID r , the receiver produces K or ⊥, which implies that the encapsulation is invalid.
B. SECURITY NOTIONS
A CLDATK must meet the conditions of deniable authentication and confidentiality. Here, we provide security notions for CLDATK. For confidentiality, we consider two games: ''IND-CCA2-i'' for i ∈ {0, 1}. It is assumed that the following two games are played between Type I/II adversaries and their challengers.
''IND-CCA2-I'' game: Setup: C executes Setup algorithm, transmits params to F I , and keeps s to itself.
• PPK queries: The description is the same as that in the IND-CCA2-I game of CLDAE in Section 2.
• PVK queries: The description is the same as that in the IND-CCA2-I game of CLDAE in Section 2.
• RPK queries: The description is the same as that in the IND-CCA2-I game of CLDAE in Section 2.
• PKR queries: The description is the same as that in the IND-CCA2-I game of CLDAE in Section 2.
• Generate symmetric key queries:
, saves the value ω (the adversary considers that this value is hidden and overrides the previous value), and transmits the key K to F I .
• Encapsulation queries: F I elects a tag τ . When there is no matching ω, C returns ⊥. Otherwise, C removes the stored value ω and outputs ϕ = Encap(ω, τ )
• Decapsulation queries: F I selects an encapsulation ϕ, a τ , and two identities ID s , ID r . C generates the receiver's SK r by implementing the PVK algorithm. It transmits the result of Decap(ϕ, τ , ID s , PK s , ID r , PK r , SK r ) to F I (if ϕ is invalid, the result is ⊥).
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Challenge: F I determines when Phase 1 is over. Then, F I outputs two challenged identities, ID * s , ID * r . In phase 1, it is not capable of requesting the partial private key, replacing the public key, and private key of identity ID * r . C executes
, randomly selects K 0 , b ∈ {0, 1}, and transmits K b to F I . F I will request the same queries as before when it receives K b . Then, F I produces a tag τ * . C calculates ϕ * = Encap(ω * , τ * ) as a challenged encapsulation and transmits it to F I .
Phase 2: F I requests queries as in Phase 1. In this phase, it is not capable of requesting the partial private key, replacing the public key, and the private key of identity ID * r as in phase 1. Additionally, Phase 1: F II also performs the following queries as does the adversary F I . However, it does not need to request PPK queries because F II is capable of performing that calculation itself.
• PVK queries: The description is the same as that of CLDATK's IND-CCA2-I game.
• RPK queries: The description is the same as that of CLDATK's IND-CCA2-I game.
• GSK queries: The description is the same as that of CLDATK's IND-CCA2-I game.
• Encapsulation queries:: The description is the same as that of CLDATK's IND-CCA2-I game.
• Decapsulation queries: The description is the same as that of CLDATK's IND-CCA2-I game. Challenge: F II determines when Phase 1 is over. Then, F II outputs (ID * s , ID * r ), which are two challenged identities. In phase 1, it cannot request the private key of iden- 
where Pr[b = b] denotes the probability. In the IND-CCA2-i game, we assume that the adversary can execute a PVK query on identity ID * s , which ensures the scheme's forward security. In other words, even if the sender's private key is compromised, confidentiality is preserved.
For deniable authentication, the security concept used in our construction is deniable authentication against adaptive chosen message attacks (DA-CMA). Here, there are two games, ''DA-CMA-i''(i ∈ {I , II }). These two games are played between Type I/II adversaries and their challengers and described as follows.
''DA-CMA-I'' game: Setup: The description is the same as that of CLDATK's IND-CCA2-I game.
Attack: The description is the same as that of CLDATK's IND-CCA2-I game.
Forgery: Definition 5: A CLDATK scheme is said to be DA-CMAi(i ∈ {I , II }) secure if no PPT adversary F I (or F II ) exists that wins the ''DA-CMA-i'' game (i ∈ {I , II }) with a nonnegligible advantage.
In the above definition, there is a restriction that F I /F I is not allowed to perform the PVK query on ID * r , which is essential for realizing deniability. The sender and the receiver can create an indistinguishable transcript.
IV. A HYBRID CLDAE
A hybrid CLDAE scheme consists of a CLDATK and a DEM. Fig. 1 shows the description. Here, the DEM returns the ciphertext, which is a tag. Such a design simplifies the scheme description and has better generic security advantages. Theorems 1 and 2 give the result of our design.
Theorem 1: We suppose that a hybrid CLDAE scheme consists of a CLDATK and a DEM. If the CLDATK and the DEM are IND-CCA2 secure and IND-CPA secure, respectively,
then CLDAE is IND-CCA2 secure. Specifically, we obtain
Refer to Appendix 1. Theorem 2: We suppose that a CLDAE consists of a CLDATK and a DEM. If the CLDATK is DA-CMA secure, the CLDAE is DA-CMA secure. Specifically, we obtain
V. A CLDATK SCHEME
Seven algorithms exist to describe our proposed scheme. Here, we set a tag as a ciphertext returned by the DEM; the goal is to simplify the description and produce better generic security advantages.
A. BASIC KNOWLEDGE
In this section, we introduce the basic properties of bilinear pairings, the decisonal bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (DBDHP), the computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDHP) and the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (BDHP).
Let G 1 , G 2 be an additive group and a multiplicative group, respectively. G 1 is generated by P, and G 1 and G 2 have the same prime order q. A bilinear pairing is a map e : G 1 ×G 1 → G 2 with the following properties: 1) Bilinearity: e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q) ab for all P, Q ∈ G 1 , a, b ∈ Z * q . 2) Non-degeneracy: There exists P, Q ∈ G 1 such that e(P, Q) = 1. 3) Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P, Q) for all P, Q ∈ G 1
The admissible maps of this type are the modified Weil pairing and the Tate pairing ( [38] - [41] provide more information). The security of this scheme lies in the difficulty of solving the problems below.
Definition 1 (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (DBDHP)): According to the aforementioned basic definition of bilinear pairings, the DBDHP is to determine θ = e(P, P) abc given (P, aP, bP, cP) with a, b, c ∈ Z * q and an element θ ∈ Z * q . Definition 2 (Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP)): According to the aforementioned basic definition of bilinear pairings, the CDHP is to compute abP given (P, aP, bP) with a, b ∈ Z * q .
Definition 3 (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP)):
According to the aforementioned basic definition of bilinear pairings, the BDHP is to compute e(P, P) abc given (P, aP, bP, cP) with a, b, c ∈ Z * q .
B. OUR SCHEME Setup: Given G 1 , G 2 , P, and e as in Subsection A, Section V. Let n be the key length of a DEM and k be a security parameter (q ≥ 2 k ), H 1 , H 2 , H 3 are three cryptographic hash functions, where 
VI. PERFORMANCE
Next, we construct a detailed performance analysis of our design with the existing schemes [29] , [35] listed in Table 1 .
We adopt an elliptic curve y 2 = x 3 +x mod p and assume that |G 1 | = 513 bits, |G 2 | = 1024 bits, |m| = 160 bits, |q| = 160 bits, |p| = 512 bits, and hash value = 160 bits. We denote the point multiplication in G 1 by PM, the exponentiation calculation in G 2 by EC, and the pairing calculation in G 2 by PC. The XOR, hash function, and addition calculations are omitted because their computation speeds are sufficiently fast as to be negligible. The size of x is |x|. √ means that this scheme has the property, while × means that this scheme does not have the property. As shown in Table 1 , [35] and our scheme can achieve IND-CCA2 and DA-CMA security simultaneously, but [29] only achieves DA-CMA.
We conducted an experiment on the PBC library. As needed, we set the library's embedding degree to 2. The experiment was executed on an Intel Pentium(R) DualCore processor running at 2.69 GHz, with 2,048 MB of RAM (2,007.04 MB available). On this machine, a PM requires 15.927 ms using an ECC with q of 160 bits. A PC and an EC require 26.68 ms and 3.126 ms, respectively. Reference [29] (hereafter denoted as JXZXL) takes 132.995 ms, [35] (hereafter called AJL) takes 189.481 ms, and our scheme takes 178.728 ms. Fig. 2 shows the computational cost for JXZXL [29] , AJL [35] , and our scheme. From  Fig. 2 , the computational cost of our scheme is greater than that of [29] , but less than that of [35] . If standard compression techniques are used, the length of the elements in groups 
VII. APPLICATION
We designed a certificateless location-based services (CLLBS) scheme utilizing the proposed CLDAE scheme that contains four phases: initialization, registration, authentication and expiration. Fig. 4 shows the concrete scheme.
A. INITIALIZATION PHASE
In this phase, the KGC executes Setup algorithm. Each entity is allotted an identity ID i , PK ID i = x ID i P and 
DAE algorithm to produce an encapsulation ciphertext σ = (W , S).
To avoid replay attacks, we form a new encrypted message by concatenating m with a timestamp t. The user then transmits the ciphertext σ to the SP. The SP calculates the symmetric key K = H 2 (T , ID s , ID r , PK ID s , PK ID r ) and decrypts the message m = DEM .Dec(K , c). To achieve confidentiality, the symmetric key is K = H 2 (T , ID s , ID r , PK ID s , PK ID r ) is kept by the user and the SP.
D. EXPIRED PHASE
Registration revocation occurs automatically because the date T expires. For example, if T is "06-30-2019", the user can access the LBS only before June 30, 2019 . This means that the public/private keys of the user automatically expire after June 30, 2019. The SP stores an identity revocation list to guarantee the validity of the users.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a hybrid CLDAE scheme in which confidentiality and deniable authentication occur in a single logical step. The design is based on a CLDATK and a DEM. We construct a CLDATK scheme that suffers neither from the public key certificate management problem nor the key escrow problem, and we provide formal proof in the ROM. A comprehensive performance analysis demonstrates that this construction is secure and effective. Compared with the two compared schemes, our design is more suitable for LBS applications.
APPENDIX

A. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof. The following is our proof strategy. The modified attack games Game 0 , Game 1 , Game 2 is defined in [42] , [43] .
The distinct of games is how the environment answers F's queries.
C submits the challenged ciphretext σ * = (ψ * , c * ) to F which can be obtained by encrypting either m 0 or m 1 on the basis of b using K * , which is also utilized to decrypt the decapsulation ψ * with the identities ID s and ID r chosen by F. In Game i (i = 0, 1, 2), we suppose that S i is the event δ = δ. δ is selected by the challenged oracle of F. δ is returned by F. The probability depends on F's random selection and those of F's oracle.
The following lemma from [44] is utilized. Game 0 : We run the suitable key extraction algorithms to simulate F's view. Then we use the generated key to answer F's queries. Therefore, F's view is the same as it is in a real attack. So we get
In this game, we merely amend how the DAD oracle answers F's queries. After the invocation of the challenged DAE oracle, (ϕ, c) and the identities (ID s , ID r ) are input to the DAD oracle. If ID s = ID * s , ID r = ID * r , ϕ = ϕ * , and under the circumstance of a Type I adversary, the public keys have not been replaced, then the DAD oracle does not utilize the genuine DAD process, instead of utilizing the key K * to decrypt c and outputs the result to F.
Such a change has no effect on F and so
Lemma 2:
A ppt algorithm C 1 's running time is the same as that of F, such that
Proof: The following proof shows how to structure an adversary C 1 of the CLDATK to resist the IND-CCA2-i(i ∈ {I , II }) attack.
The following game is played between C 1 and F.
-Setup C 1 transmits the param to F.
-Phase 1 When F executes a PPK query, PVK query, and PKR query on identity ID, C 1 executes these queries to its own oracles and transmits the respond to F. Given m, ID i and ID j , when F executes an encryption query, C 1 does the following steps.
1) Execute GSK query on (ID i , ID j ) to its own GSK query oracle to get K .
2) Calculate c = DEM .Enc(K , m).
3) Execute a KE query on c to its own KE oracle to get ϕ.
4) Output σ = (ϕ, c).
Given σ = (ϕ, c), ID i and ID j , when F executes a decryption query, C 1 does the steps below.
1) Execute a KD query on (ϕ, c, ID i , ID j ) to get its own KD oracle to get K . 2) If K =⊥, stop. • If (ID s , ID r , ϕ) = (ID * s , ID * r , ϕ * ), then the same process will be utilized before F submits to its challenged encapsulation oracle.
• Under the circumstance of a Type I adversary of a CLDATK scheme, if (ID s , ID r , ϕ) = (ID * s , ID * r , ϕ * ) and the public keys have been replaced, then C 1 responds to F's decapsulation query for (ID * s , ID * r , ϕ * , c * ) to get K . C 1 utilizes K to decrypt c and transmits the answer to F.
• Or else, C 1 utilizes K b to decrypt c and transmits the answer to F. -Guess F returns δ . If δ = δ, C 1 returns b = 1 which means K b is a real key; otherwise it returns b = 0 which means K b is a random key.
When K b is the real key, F is executed as it in Game 1 . It implies that
When K b is the random key, F is executed as it in Game 2 . It implies that
From the security definition of CLDATK, we get
Lemma 3:
A ppt algorithm C 2 's running time is the same as that of F, such that
Proof: The following proof shows how to construct an adversary C 2 of the CLDATK to resist the IND-PA attack. F is executed as it would be executed in game Game 2 . Before F asks its challenged DAE query, we execute the corresponding CLDATK algorithms to answer F's queries. When F asks its challenged DAE oracle with identities (ID * s , ID * r ), and messages (m 0 , m 1 ), we just transfer (m 0 , m 1 ) to C 2 's challenged encryption oracle to get c * . Then we request a GSK query to get K * and ask an encapsulation query to obtain ϕ * . We send (ϕ * , c * ) to F and throw away K * . We utilize the same procedure to answer F's queries as before apart from that if it asks a DAD query on (ID * s , ID * r , ϕ * , c) for some c. In this case of two cases:
-If a Type I adversary F's public keys have been replaced, then C 2 decapsulates (ID * s , ID * r , ϕ * , c) by the secret key to get K , decrypts c and sends it to F. -Or else, we ask the decryption oracle of C 2 with c and send the result to F. Pr [S 2 ] is the probability that C 2 accurately identifies the hidden bits of its challenged encryption oracle because C 2 returns whatever F returns.
B. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: F is an adversary that attacks the CLDAE scheme with advantage Adv DA−CMA−i CLDAE (F), for i ∈ {I , II }. An algorithm C that attacks the DA-CMA-i for the CLDATK with advantage at least Adv DA−CMA−i CLDAE (F). We answers F's queries as follows.
-Setup: C transmits param to F.
-Attack: When F executes a PPK query, PVK query, and PKR query on identity ID, C executes these queries to its own oracles and transmits the response to F. Given m, ID i and ID j , when F executes a DAE query, C does the steps generate symmetric key query, encapsulation query and decapsulation query as C 1 does in Lemma 2.
-Fogery:
, in which τ * = c * . Visibly, this is a perfect proof. If F wins the DA-CMA-i i ∈ {I , II } game for CLDAE, C has the same advantage to win the DA-CMA-i game for CLDATK.
C. PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof: The proposed CLDATK is IND-CCA2-i (i ∈ {I , II }) secure in the ROM under the DBDH and CDH assumptions.
Proof: This theorem follows from Lemmas 4 and 5. Lemma 4: In the ROM, under the DBDH assumption, a PPT adversary F I has a non-negligible advantage datk winning the IND-CCA2-I game when executing in a time t and making q H i queries to H i (i = 1, 2, 3), q par PPK queries, q pk PK queries, q gsk GSK queries, q ke KE queries, and q kd KD queries, then C settles the DBDH problem with a probability
Proof: C gets an input (P, aP, bP, cP) and makes an attempt to calculate e(P, P) abc . C plays F I 's challenger and executes F I as a subroutine. C will answer F I 's queries on H 1 , H 2 and H 3 . These answers are randomly produced, C maintains three lists L 1 , L 2 and L 3 to save the answers. We make the assumptions as follows.
1) When F I requests the PPKE, SPK, GSK, KE and KD queries on identity ID, It must first request H ID . 2) The result of a KE query will not be utilized in a KD query. -Setup F I receives the system parameters with P pub = cP from C. Here C does not know c. -Phase 1 F I executes the following queries.
-H 1 queries C randomly elects γ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , q H 1 }.
F I requests H 1 queries on its choice identities. At the γ -th query, C responds by H 1 (ID γ ) = bP. At the i-th query with i = γ , C elects w i ∈ Z * q , adds (ID i , w i ) in the list L 1 and responds H 1 (ID i ) = w i P.
-H 2 , H 3 queries F I requests its choice hash queries, C checks whether their lists include the corresponding items. If it is, F I will receive the already response; otherwise, a random value will be chosen. The request and response are added in the corresponding list. -PPKE queries F I requests PPKE queries on iden- 
-Key encapsulation queries F I generates τ .
C checks if value ω is already exist. If not, C fails. Otherwise, C does the process as follows.
C can get the private key S ID j by executing the SPK query. C executes H 3 queries to obtain h = H 3 (τ, T ), then calculate S = hQ ID i and W = Te(S, S ID j ). Finally, C transmits σ = (S, W ) to F I . -Key decapsulation queries F I submits a tag τ , an encapsulation σ , the identities (ID i , ID j ) of a sender and a receiver.
, in which T = W /e(S, S ID j ), and C responds h which meets S = hQ ID i , it will fail. From F I 's point of view, σ = (S, W ) is valid. The probability is at most 1/2 k . If ID j = ID γ , C can get the private key S ID j by executing the SPK query. Then it transmits the result of Decap(σ, τ, ID i , S ID j ) to F I . -Challenge: F I determines when phase 1 ends.
It creates challenged identities (ID s , ID r ). If F I has requested private key query on ID γ , C fails. If F I does not elect ID r = ID γ as its target identity, it also fails too. C elects W * ∈ G 2 , sets S * = aP and calculates T * = W * /θ (θ is the DBDH problem's candidate). Then C executes H 2 query to search K 1 = H 2 (T * ). C randomly elects K 0 , β ∈ {0, 1}, and transmits K β to F I . Then F I transmits a tag τ * to C. Subsequently, C sends σ * = (S * , W * ) to F I . -Phase 2: F I adaptively requests queries again as in phase 1 except it is not capable of asking a PPK query on ID r and a KD query on (σ * , τ * ) to get the private key. -Guess: F I returns a bit β for (K β , ω * ) = Sym(S ID s , ID s , PK ID s , ID r , PK ID r ) and σ * = Encap(ω * , τ * ) hold. If β = β, C outputs 1 means θ = e(P, P) abc ; Otherwise, C outputs 0 means θ = e(P, P) abc . Now C's successful probability is estimated. C will fail if one of the following separate events is provided:
• E 1 : F I does not elect ID γ as the receiver's identity in the challenge phase.
• E 2 : F I has asked a partial private key query on ID γ .
• E 3 : C terminates in a decapsulation query since it rejects a valid encapsulation. It is known that Pr[¬E 1 ] = 1/q H 1 , and Pr[E 3 ]≤ q kd /2 k . Additionally, ¬E 1 means ¬E 2 .
Because
We get Proof: To wield the forking algorithm [44] , we have to prove how our design is applicable for the signature scheme described in [44] . In CLDATK imitate steps, the sender's private key fails (implying that the master private key fails). In this case, a method is needed to settle the BDH problem.
First, observe that the CLDATK of our design meets the requested three-phase honest-verifier zero-knowledge identification protocol, in which σ 1 = T is the commitment, h = H 3 (τ, T , PK ID i , PK ID j , R) is the hash value, and σ 2 = W is the answer.
Second, we give a concrete imitate step and show a method of settling the BDH problem. Upon inputting (P, aP, bP, cP) of the BDH problem, C is needed to calculate h = e(P, P) abc . C executes F I as a subroutine. F I consults C to answer H 1 , H 2 , and H 3 and C holds L 1 , L 2 , and L 3 to save the randomly generated responses. We describe this following process.
-Setup: C computes params with P pub = cP and sends P pub with c to F I . -Attack: C responds F I 's queries on the basis of the approach in Lemma 4 in addition to elect two different random values α, β ∈ {1, 2, . . . , q H 1 } beforehand. At the α-th H 1 query, C responds by H 1 (ID α ) = aP. At the β-th H 1 query, C responds by
If we assume ID γ = {ID α , ID β }, the process of simulation is the same as Lemma 4. -Fogery: F I returns a tuple (σ * , τ * , ID α , ID β ), in which σ * = (S * , W * ). We coalesce (ID α , ID β ) and τ into a ''generalized '' forged tag (ID γ , τ * ) in order to hide the identity-based aspect of the DA-CMA attack, and simulate the setting of an identity-less adaptive-CMA existential forgery. If F I is an efficient forger, then we are able to structure a Las Vegas machine F I which returns ((ID γ , τ * ), h * , σ * ) and ((ID γ ,τ * ),h * ,σ * ) with h * =h * and the same commitment T * . To settle the BDH problem based on the machine F I , we structure a machine C as follows. 1) C executes F I to receive two distinct signatures ((ID γ , τ * ), h * , σ * ) and ((ID γ , τ * ),h * ,σ * ). 2) C calculates e(P, P) abc as (W * /W * ) 1/(h * −h * ) . From the forking lemma [44] and the lemma on the relationship between given-identity and chosen-identity attack [45] , [46] , if F I succeeds in time t with probability
. Note that there is a change in the coefficient because the simulation elects two distinct values beforehand.
Lemma 7: In the ROM, under the CDH assumption, a PPT adversary F II has a non-negligible advantage datk winning the DA-CMA-II game when executing in a time t and making q H i queries to H i (i = 1, 2, 3), q pvk private key(PVK) queries, q pk PK queries, q gsk GSK queries, q ke KE queries, and q kd KD queries, then C settles the CDH problem with probability > ( datk − (2/q pvk + q ke (q ke + q H 3 + 2)/2 k ), within time t ≤ t + (q gsk + 2q ke + q kd + 2q H 3 )t e , in which t e means the time to calculate one pairing.
Proof: C gets an input (P, aP, bP) and makes an attempt to calculate abP. C plays F II 's challenger and executes F II as a subroutine. C will answer F II 's queries on H 1 , H 2 and H 3 . These responses are randomly produced, and C maintains three lists L 1 , L 2 and L 3 to save the responses. Notice that both C and F II can calculate the partial private key D ID i = sH 1 (ID i ). We make the assumptions as follows.
1) When F II requests the SPK, GSK, KE and KD queries on identity ID, It must first request H ID .
2) The result of a KE query will not be utilized in a KD query. C responds F II 's various queries on the basis of the method in Lemma 5.
Eventually, F II returns a valid ciphertext σ * = (S * , W * ) from identities ID γ , ID δ . F II is not aware of σ * is not a valid σ * for (SK ID i , Q ID j ) unless it makes for the hash value H 3 (τ ; T ; r i aP; r i bP; r 2 i abP). In this situation, the CDH problem's solution would be inserted in L 3 . Then C seeks L 3 for tuples (τ ; T ; r i aP; r i bP; R). For each of them, C checks whether e(r 2 i P; R) = e(r i aP; r i bP). If yes, C stops and returns R = abP. If no, C fails. Now we assess the failure probability of C. C fails if F II requests the PVK queries on ID γ , ID δ . The failure probability is exactly 2/q pvk . The failure probability is at most q ke (q ke + q H 3 )/2 k for a conflict on H 3 in a key encapsulation query. The probability of rejecting a valid ciphertext is at most 2/2 k . The bound on C's calculation time is a fact that each symmetric key query needs one pairing calculation, each key encapsulation query needs at most 2 pairing evaluations, each key decapsulation query needs one pairing evaluation. The solution's extraction from L 3 needs at most 2q H 3 
